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What are the Most Common Attack Vectors in Cyber Security?  

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A cyberattack vector is the way an attacker enters a system, network, or application. Most cyberattacks start through common entry points such as phishing emails, weak or reused passwords, unpatched software, malware, or insecure applications. Understanding cyberattack vectors helps prevent attacks by closing these entry points before damage occurs. 

Most cyberattacks don’t begin with advanced hacking tools or elite technical skills. They begin with everyday actions that feel harmless. A single click on a link, an email that looks routine, a file download, a reused password, or a software update that keeps getting postponed. Attackers are not looking for the hardest way in. They are looking for the easiest one. 

These easy entry points are called cyber-attack vectors. An attack vector is the path an attacker uses to enter a system, application, or network. In most cases, the path already exists due to small security gaps, basic configuration mistakes, or simple lack of awareness. This is why understanding attack vectors cyber security is critical. It explains how attacks succeed even in organizations that use modern security tools and technologies. 

Research consistently shows that human actions play a role in more than 80% of data breaches. This does not mean people are careless. It means attackers design their methods around normal behavior. When entry points are left open, threat actors exploit them quietly and efficiently. 

This is why learning how attacks enter a system matters more at the beginning than learning security tools. If entry points are not secured, detection tools often react too late. For beginners, understanding attack vectors cyber security builds the awareness needed to recognize risk early and forms the foundation for everything else in cybersecurity. 

attack vectors cyber security

Kolkata New Year Phishing Scam

During the New Year season, cybercriminals targeted people in Kolkata using fake event offers and promotional deals. Attackers created phony advertisements, cloned websites, and misleading links that appeared to represent legitimate New Year events and booking platforms. These links were made to look authentic and time-sensitive.

Delivery Channels:

The phishing links were circulated through sponsored social media ads, messaging apps, and manipulated search results, increasing their visibility and credibility.

Victims who clicked on these links were asked to enter personal details or make advance payments. As a result, multiple individuals were defrauded, leading to collective financial losses of around ₹40 lakh. The incident highlights how phishing attacks exploit trust, urgency, and seasonal events to trick users into unsafe actions.

How It Could Have Been Avoided:

Users could have reduced the risk by booking events only through official websites, avoiding links from ads or messages, carefully checking website URLs, and being cautious of offers that created urgency or seemed unusually attractive.

Malware-Based Cyberattack on Kolkata Real Estate Firm

A real estate and infrastructure company in Kolkata recently reported a significant malware-related cyberattack after discovering that multiple data servers and computer systems had been compromised. The breach was first noticed early in the morning when a ransom note appeared on the affected systems, indicating that malware had encrypted or locked key files, disrupting critical business operations.

Delivery Channels:

The malware infiltrated the company’s systems despite having firewalls and antivirus software in place, suggesting that attackers exploited unprotected entry points such as outdated software, weak credentials, or misconfigured systems to bypass technical defenses.

Once inside, the attackers were able to access sensitive operational and business data, forcing the organization to halt essential functions such as project management, billing, and internal communication. The incident threatened financial stability and posed potential legal risks if client or employee data was exposed.

How It Could Have Been Avoided:

This malware attack could have been reduced or prevented through frequent software updates, stronger access controls such as multi-factor authentication, regular security audits, network segmentation, and employee awareness training to detect suspicious activity early.

Ransomware Attack on Ingram Micro (July 2025)

Ingram Micro Holding Corporation, a major global IT distributor, confirmed a ransomware attack that compromised certain internal systems by encrypting or locking access to critical resources. As a result, the company was forced to take multiple systems offline to contain the incident and prevent further spread.

Delivery Channels:

The ransomware infiltrated despite existing security controls, likely exploiting vulnerabilities such as compromised VPN credentials, weak passwords, or unpatched software. This allowed attackers to gain quiet initial access before deploying the ransomware across the network.

Impacts:

The attack caused a global operational shutdown, disrupting order processing, shipping, and digital platforms including Xvantage. These disruptions led to significant supply chain delays for partners and customers. Ingram Micro engaged cybersecurity experts and law enforcement, and issued apologies for the downtime that threatened revenue and business continuity across the IT distribution ecosystem.

How It Could Have Been Avoided:

Regular patching of VPN and software vulnerabilities, strict enforcement of multi-factor authentication, network segmentation to restrict lateral movement, employee phishing awareness training, and routine backups with air-gapped storage could have reduced the risk of entry, limited the spread, and shortened recovery time.

Weak Passwords & Credential Theft on MGM Resorts

MGM Resorts International identified a major cybersecurity incident in which attackers leveraged stolen credentials to breach internal systems. The attackers exploited weak or reused passwords from prior data leaks, enabling unauthorized access and allowing them to impersonate legitimate users across critical platforms.

Delivery Channels:

Scattered Spider and ALPHV attackers conducted vishing and phishing attacks against helpdesk staff to obtain password resets. This was followed by credential stuffing, where leaked username–password combinations were tested via brute-force attacks on Okta authentication services and VPN portals where multi-factor authentication was not consistently enforced.

Impacts:

The incident led to system shutdowns lasting more than 10 days across over 30 MGM properties. Slot machines, digital room keys, check-ins, and reservation systems were disabled, resulting in revenue losses exceeding $100 million. Customer personally identifiable information—including names, dates of birth, identification details, and some Social Security numbers—was exposed, triggering lawsuits and regulatory investigations.

How It Could Have Been Avoided:

The risk could have been significantly reduced by enforcing multi-factor authentication on all accounts including helpdesk systems, using password managers to prevent password reuse, monitoring dark web sources for leaked credentials, conducting regular vishing and phishing awareness training, implementing zero-trust access verification, and rotating credentials immediately following any suspected compromise.

Unpatched Software Vulnerabilities on Kaseya

Kaseya VSA remote management software was exploited through CVE-2021-30116, a zero-day vulnerability chain involving authentication bypass and arbitrary code execution. The attack enabled the deployment of REvil ransomware across more than 1,500 customer organizations and approximately 60,000 endpoints worldwide.

Delivery Channels:

Attackers actively scanned internet-exposed Kaseya VSA servers for the unpatched vulnerability. Although security patches were released on July 1, delayed application left many on-premises deployments exposed to automated exploitation targeting known weaknesses in outdated systems.

Impacts:

The incident triggered global supply chain disruption, impacting retailers such as Sweden’s Coop, which was forced to close approximately 800 stores, along with schools and managed service providers. Ransom demands reached up to $70 million, while organizations faced weeks of downtime, extensive recovery costs, and long-term operational damage, highlighting the catastrophic ripple effects of unpatched software.

How It Could Have Been Avoided:

The impact could have been significantly reduced through automated patch management with immediate deployment of critical updates, strict firewall rules blocking external access to VSA administrative interfaces, continuous vulnerability scanning, rigorous supply chain vendor security audits, network isolation of management tools, and regular offline backups to minimize exposure and speed recovery.

 

Insider Threats (Malicious & Accidental) on Tesla (2021)

In 2021, Tesla software engineer Alex Khatilov maliciously exfiltrated thousands of proprietary automation scripts and internal files to his personal Dropbox account shortly after being hired. By abusing trusted new-employee access, he was able to steal critical business logic and sensitive intellectual property.

Delivery Channels:

Khatilov used legitimate engineering credentials to access and download sensitive files beyond his role scope, disguising the activity as routine onboarding behavior. Since the data transfers occurred internally using authorized access, they bypassed perimeter defenses, and the download volumes appeared normal.

Impacts:

The exposure of Tesla’s automation processes created risks of competitive sabotage and intellectual property theft. The incident led to a lawsuit for trade secret theft, potential multimillion-dollar damages, and accelerated the need for enhanced insider threat monitoring, highlighting the challenges of detecting abuse by trusted users.

How It Could Have Been Avoided:

The threat could have been mitigated through data loss prevention (DLP) controls to block mass downloads to personal cloud storage, user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA) to flag role-inappropriate access, restricted access during probationary periods, endpoint monitoring during onboarding, mandatory NDA acknowledgment, and behavioral baseline profiling for new hires.

Web Application Attacks on Uber (September 2022)

In September 2022, Uber experienced an organization-wide breach after an attacker used stolen credentials to access an internal web tool that lacked proper input validation. This weakness enabled lateral movement through insecure APIs and database queries, ultimately leading to compromise of critical internal systems.

Delivery Channels:

The attacker bypassed multi-factor authentication through social engineering of a contractor and then targeted the MWR intranet search tool, which was vulnerable to command injection or SQL injection–like abuse. Weak API authentication controls allowed further escalation into AWS, GSuite, Slack, and GitHub repositories.

Impacts:

The breach resulted in near-total infrastructure compromise, exposing source code, internal vulnerability reports, and financial data. The attacker publicly taunted employees via Slack, forcing Uber to initiate a global systems lockdown, rotate credentials, and engage in a costly incident response effort, demonstrating how insecure internal web applications can cascade into full organizational takeover.

How It Could Have Been Avoided:

The incident could have been mitigated by deploying a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block injection attempts, enforcing parameterized queries and strict input sanitization, implementing an API gateway with OAuth or JWT-based authentication, applying zero-trust principles to internal tools, integrating automated code scanning into CI/CD pipelines, and conducting regular penetration testing across all web endpoints.

Network-Based Attacks on Colonial Pipeline (May 2021)

In May 2021, Colonial Pipeline’s network was compromised after attackers used stolen VPN credentials to gain access to internal systems. The DarkSide ransomware group leveraged this foothold to intercept network traffic, move laterally across poorly segmented IT and OT environments, and encrypt critical billing systems that supported pipeline operations.

Delivery Channels:

Attackers exploited weak network segmentation between corporate IT networks and operational pipeline systems. Using compromised credentials, they conducted man-in-the-middle–style lateral movement and packet sniffing of unencrypted internal communications during reconnaissance, enabling deeper access across the environment.

Impacts:

Pipeline operations were halted for approximately six days, disrupting nearly 45 percent of the U.S. East Coast fuel supply. The outage triggered fuel shortages, price spikes, and multiple state emergency declarations, ultimately resulting in a $4.4 million Bitcoin ransom payment and demonstrating the cascading impact of network-based attacks on critical infrastructure.

How It Could Have Been Avoided:

The incident could have been mitigated through network micro-segmentation to isolate operational technology from corporate IT, strict enforcement of multi-factor authentication on VPN access, encryption of all internal network traffic, deployment of IDS/IPS solutions to detect lateral movement, air-gapped backups for OT systems, and adoption of zero-trust network access policies.

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Build practical cybersecurity skills to protect systems, networks, and data from real-world cyber threats. Learn how vulnerabilities are identified, attacks are analyzed, and security controls are implemented across modern IT and cloud environments. 

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